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ABSTRACT 
 
How does technological innovation impact the financial performance of technology-intensive firms? 
From the knowledge-based view, we hypothesized and tested a positive performance effect of patent 
scale and scope by two samples of patenting-only versus full firm-years of 106 Fabless firms in 
Taiwan, during 1995 and 2008. Our results show that patent scale generates stronger direct effects than 
patent scope in both samples; contrastingly patent scope requires mediators to impact performance 
indirectly in the full-sample, and rarely demonstrates any effect in the patenting-sample. In addition, 
the fullsample demonstrates a stronger direct or mediated effect of patent than the patenting-sample. 
 
Keywords: Performance; Patents; Technological Innovation Theory; Southeast Asia; Computers and 
Electronics; Scale and Scope. 
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How Does Innovation Impact Firm Performance?  
Direct versus Mediated Effects of Patent Scale and Scope 
How does technological innovation impact the financial performance of technology-intensive 
firms? One of the key research fields in strategic management has been the identification of 
performance determinants, along with the explanations of performance variations between firms 
(Decarolis & Deeds, 1999, Grant, 1996). From the knowledge-based view (KBV), our research 
attempts to identify what kinds of firm heterogeneity, with a focus on technological innovation, and 
in what ways determine firm performance. Following Teece’s argument (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997) that the profitable expansion of firms is both a process of exploiting firm-specific capabilities 
and exploring new ones, we assert that technological innovation, especially when its exploration is 
disclosed and its exploitation is protected by the patenting institution, is the major firm-specific 
capabilities to sustain competitive advantage, particularly for technology-intensive firms (Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2000). 
Since financial figures are composite indicators of firm performance, we tested our hypothesized 
performance models by two samples consisting of single-business firms of a single technology-
intensive industry located in a single economy, for highlighting the performance effect of technological 
innovation, measured by patent attributes. The prior literature has identified ‘industry membership’, 
‘corporate effect’ and ‘business strategy’ as key drivers of business-unit performance (Brush, 
Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 1999, Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989, McGahan & Porter, 1997, Rumelt, 1991, 
Schmalensee, 1985, Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997, Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). Some of the 
performance studies have empirically supported that ‘business-level’ factors have greater impacts on 
performance than either ‘industry membership’ or ‘corporate effect’ (McGahan & Porter, 1997; 
Rumelt, 1991). Moreover, some studies found that organizational factors explain about twice as much 
variance in financial performance as economic factors (Hansen & Wernerfelt, 1989). Accordingly, 
we devised three performance models focusing on the firm-specific heterogeneity to explain the 
financial performance variation amongst single-business firms, as opposed to multi-business 
corporations in the mainstream performance studies. 
In addition to concentrating the business scope of firms on single-business, our research selects 
technology-intensive as the industry focus. Helfat and Raubitschek (2000) defined technology-intensive 
firms as those requiring generally more complex coordination of knowledge and activities. However, 
given such complexity, the question as to whether the performance determinants of technology-
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intensive firms are any different from those of other firms remains unanswered. Untangling such a 
puzzle, we set out to identify the performance determinants from the knowledge-based view (KBV) as 
technological innovation, measured by six attributes of firm-specific patent portfolio.  
Although many of the prior studies have proposed a positive relationship between technological 
innovation and performance, the results have nevertheless been inconsistent. For example, based on a 
sample of 98 biotechnology firms in the US, Decarolis & Deeds (1999) failed to find empirical support 
for a positive effect. Whereas, several studies have supported a positive relationship, including a sample 
of 721 large firms in the UK (Geroski & Machin, 1993), a sample of 50 machine tool manufacturers in 
Germany (Ernst, 2001), and a sample of 250 technology-leading farms in the Netherlands (Diederen, 
Meijl, & Wolters, 2001). Specifically using patent portfolio to measure technological innovation, some 
studies found empirical support that patent can contribute to firm performance (Bloom & Reenen, 2002, 
Lin, Chen, & Wu, 2006) 
Aligning our performance models with the mainstream empirical findings and the assertions of 
the KBV, we hypothesize a positive effect of patent scale and scope on financial performance, 
particularly for technology-intensive. Perceiving the firm as a collection of productive resources (Penrose, 
1959), the theorists from the resource-based view (RBV) suggest that differential performance among 
firms is fundamentally driven by the firm-specific heterogeneity, in terms of resources, competence and 
dynamic capabilities, which have been characterized as ‘rare, valuable, non-substitutable, and difficult to 
imitate’ (Barney, 1991, Mahoney, 1995, Mahoney & Pandian, 1992, Makadok, 2001, Rumelt, 1984, 
Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997, Wernerfelt, 1984). Extending from the RBV, perceiving the firm as an 
institute for the integration of knowledge (Grant, 1996), the KBV theorists identify knowledge as the 
most strategically important resource and major performance determinant, based on the argument that 
superior performance comes from the generation, accumulation and application of knowledge 
(Decarolis & Deeds, 1999, Grant, 1996, Kogut & Zander, 1992, Spender, 1996).  
In addition to specify patent as performance determinant, our performance models also compare 
the performance effects between patent scale and patent scope on multiple performance targets, 
including profitability, profits, and shareholder value, in order to specify strategic fitness between 
innovation strategies and performance targets. The economies of scale and scope have been recognized 
as the major sources of competitive advantage by economists, particularly since Chandler identified the 
importance of the investment needed to capture the economies of scale and scope inherent in the new 
technologies (Chandler, 1990, Teece, 1993). As Chandler, most scholars refer economies of scale and 
scope to the cost-saving benefits from more units of goods or services produced, and wider related 
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activities integrated by a production team. We further extend the benefits of scale and scope from cost-
saving to revenue-generation, so posit that such economies of scale and scope are also applicable to the 
innovation outcomes as superior patent portfolio for a technology-intensive firm to improve its financial 
performance.  
In summary, we attempt to contribute the literature in the following three aspects, which also 
motivate our research efforts. First, for the literature of the Knowledge-based view (KBV), our 
research may provide additional empirical support for its key argument that the firm heterogeneity in 
knowledge assets, such as patent portfolio, does explain the variance in firm performance, and 
ultimately lead to competitive advantage, particularly for technology- intensive firms. Second, for the 
literature of performance studies, we concentrated on the single-business firms of a technology-
intensive industry in an emerging economy, in order to reduce the causal ambiguity and complexity 
between various determinants and financial performance. In terms of empirical setting, our samples 
consisting of small and medium firms located in emerging economies are expected to provide 
complementary evidence and strategic implications supporting the performance effects of 
technological innovation, as opposed to the mainstream performance studies on large firms located in 
developed economies. Third, for the literature of technological innovation, our findings are analyzed 
to specify the applicable conditions for a firm to enhance its competitive advantage by comparing 
contrasting lagging direct versus mediated effects between patent scale versus patent scope on 
multiple performance targets, in order to further develop the contingent view of innovation strategy.  
The following sections will hypothesize our performance model, describe our research methods, 
including samples and data, variables and measures, and test models, and then discuss our empirical 
results and research findings. 
HYPOTHESIZED PERFORMANCE MODELS 
From the knowledge-based view (KBV), we hypothesize a positive performance effect of 
technological innovation, measured by the attributes of firm-specific patent portfolio. In order to 
examine whether and indeed how such effect occurs, we empirically tested our hypothesized effect in 
two consecutive research steps. First, t-tests on four pairs of mean-difference between performance 
variables of patenting and non-patenting sub-samples are devised to confirm whether or not such effect 
exists. Second, two performance models of direct and mediated effects are posited to further examine 
which patent attribute under what conditions generates more or less performance effects.  
Whether or not Performance Effects of Patent Exist 
Following our hypothesis, if the ownership of patent positively contributes to firm performance, 
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patenting firms or firm-years are expected to perform better than non-patenting firms or firm-years. 
Accordingly, we posit that patenting sub-samples gain advantage over their countering non-patenting 
sub-samples. In other words, the t-test results are expected as the mean of performance variables of a 
patenting sub-sample minus that of a non-patenting sub-sample is significantly more than zero. Because 
a patenting firms, defined as whose portfolio with at least one patent, may have both patenting and non-
patenting firm years, we split our full samples of firm-years into the following four pairs of mutually 
exclusive sub-samples, as illustrated in TABLE 5, base on only one attribute of patent scale. The test of 
Hypothesis 1 aims to empirically confirm that our hypothesized positive performance effect does exist, 
as a foundation to test Hypothesis 2, further examining how much different attributes impact firm 
performance.  
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a patent perform better than those without any. 
For examining Hypothesis 1 on the performance premium of patents from matrix-dimensions 
of firm-year and firm-level, we specify the following four types of performance effects tested by four 
corresponding pairs of patenting versus non-patenting sub-samples. 
Patenting firm-year effect (PS – NY). In order to test whether or not a positive performance 
effect exists at the analysis level of firm-years, we split the Full-Sample (FS) of all firm-years into 
Patenting Sample (PS), including only patenting firm-years, versus Non-patenting firm-Years of all 
firms (NY), including patenting and non-patenting firms.  
Patenting firm effect (PF – NF). In order to test whether or not a positive performance effect 
exists at the analysis level of firm, we split the full-sample into Patenting Firm (PF), including both 
patenting and non-patenting firm-years, versus Non-patenting Firm (NF), including only non-
patenting firm-years.  
Firm-year effect of patenting firm (PS – NP). In order to test whether or not a positive 
performance effect exists within the same patenting firm at the analysis level of firm-year, we split 
the sub-sample of patenting firm (PF) into Patenting Sample (PS), versus Non-patenting firm-years of 
Patenting firm (NP).  
Non-patenting firm-year effect of patenting firm (NP – NF). In order to test whether or not a 
positive performance effect still sustain for a patenting firm even when whose firm-years without any 
patent at the analysis level of firm, we split the sub-sample of non-patenting firm-years (NY) into 
Non-patenting firm-years of Patenting firm (NP), versus Non-patenting Firm (NF).  
Performance Model of Patent’s Direct Effect 
In addition to Hypothesis 1 testing whether or not a positive performance effect of patent exists, 
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we further posit Hypothesis 2 to test more or less performance effects of superior patent portfolio than 
inferior portfolio by comparing lagging direct versus mediated effects of patent scale versus patent 
scope attributes. From the aforementioned contingent view of innovation strategy, we posit that 
different attributes of patent portfolio, even highly correlated with one another as shown in TABLE 3, 
contribute to different performance targets. For examining how much each patent attribute impacts firm 
performance, we devised two performance models for testing the degrees of direct and mediated effects 
of patent attributes. Because we posit a patent variable impacts a performance variable by either direct 
or mediated effect alternatively, our model only recognizes complete mediator, not partial mediator. In 
other words, our model of mediated effect, as illustrated in FIGURE 1, only tested the pairs of patent 
and performance variables without significantly positive coefficient in the model of direct effect.  
Hypothesis 2: Firms with superior patent portfolio perform better than those with inferior 
portfolio. 
The performance model for testing patent’s direct effect is specified as one of six patent variables 
and its square-term, to reflect the diminishing return to scale, as independent variable (IV), and one of 
eight performance measures as dependent variable (DV) as listed in Regression C in Figure 1. All 
regressions include the same control variables (CV) of AGE, SIZE, and RDI (Research & Development 
Intensity).  
Performance Model of Patent’s Mediated Effect 
In order to illustrate how patent attributes indirectly impact financial performance in the absence 
of their direct effect, we devised a complete-mediating model as Figure 1. Therefore, a pair of patent 
and performance variable is posited to impact performance either directly or indirectly through 
mediator.  
Lagging direct and mediated effects. Since both mediators are a component of financial 
performance, our mediating model specifies one-year lag of Regression B, mediator as IV and 
performance as DV. For comparing lag effect of patent attributes over time (Hall, Griliches, & 
Hausman, 1986), we specify 1, 2, and 3 lag-years of Regression A, patent as IV and mediator as DV. 
Contrastingly for direct effects, we tested each pair of patent and performance variables by four 
regressions, with concurrent (0), 1, 2, and 3 lag-years. Due to the three-year rolling method in 
constructing our patent portfolio, our models are expected to capture the performance impact of a patent, 
when filed up to six years before a focal performance year.   
RESEARCH METHODS 
In order to empirically test our hypothesized performance models, we sampled 1026 firm-years 
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of 106 Fabless firms listed in Taiwan, the second largest economy of Semiconductor industry, during 
the period of 1995 and 2008. The sample, measures, and test-models of this study are further described 
as follows. 
Sample and Data: Fabless Firms in Taiwan 
In order to control for the industry and institution factors impact on performance of technology-
intensive firms, our sample focuses on the single-business firms in the same country (Taiwan) and 
within the same technology-intensive industry (Fabless).  
Financial data from TEJ. Fabless firms are identified based on the third-level of industry code, 
M2324 within the semiconductor industry, from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Databank, which 
provides the firm profile and financial data (TEJ, 2008). As a result, our full-sample comprises 1026 
firm-years of 106 Fabless firms listed in Taiwan, during the period of 1995 and 2008.  In addition to 
financial data extracted from TEJ databank, we also downloaded the patent application data from 
Delphion Database (Delphion, 2008). Based on the aforementioned three-year rolling method, we 
constructed 342 patenting firm-years of 73 Fabless firms during 1994 and 20071. Because 4 firms with 
patents were not listed or included in our full-sample, the patenting-sample used for our empirical 
testing comprises of 327 firm-years of 69 fabless firms.  
Patent data from Delphion. Patent data for our sampled firms was taken from the Delphion 
patent database, which carries detail accounts for companies and patents filed with the USPTO. The 
Delphion database pieces together the corporate structure of the patent filing companies in order to 
produce accurate patent lists for each company, including their subsidiaries. We initially retrieved all 
the patents applied by our sample firms, but included in our analysis were those filed patents which 
had been subsequent granted to ensure our investigated patents are of relevance. Our final patent data 
is comprised of 3,279 patents applied and granted during 1994 and 2007. It should be noted, not all of 
these companies were in the sample for all years.  
Variables and Measures: Performance and Patent 
Our hypothesized models specify 8 performance variables as dependent variables (DV), 6 patent 
variables as independent variable (IV), 3 control variables (CV), and 2 mediators (MV), with ‘firm-year’ 
as the level of analysis, as illustrated in FIGURE 1. TABLE 2 lists the type, short code, definition, 
mean, standard deviation of each variable and TABLE 3 lists correlations of Full-sample. As discussed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 We used the patent dataset collected during our prior research Chen, J. H., Jang, S.-L., & 
Wen, S. H. 2010. Measuring technological diversification: Identifying the effects of patent 
scale and patent scope. . Scientometrics, 84(1): 265-75.  
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earlier, we specify only one patent variable and one performance variable when testing direct effects, in 
order to demonstrate the strategic fitness between technological innovation and performance target; 
therefore, the issue of multicolinearity caused by high correlations among independent variables is 
minimized in our models. 
The reasons to specify and the measures to quantify our specified variables and their definitions 
are elaborated as the following.  
Financial performance as dependent variable. Both performance models of direct and mediated 
effect specify three performance dimensions, including profitability, measured by return on equity 
(ROE), profits, measured by net income (NI), and shareholder value, measured by market value 
approximated (MVA, market value minus capital invested). From the dimension of profitability, we 
prefer ‘return on equity’ to ‘return on assets’ (ROA), because our sampled Fabless firms have minimal 
fixed assets when outsourcing the semiconductor manufacturing to foundry-firms. From the dimension 
of the shareholder value, we prefer ‘market value approximated’ (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001) to 
‘earning per share’ (EPS) to reflect the premium value created by the firm. TABLE 3 shows that the 
correlations among three performance variables are below 0.19, which attests to their adequacy to 
demonstrate the contingent impacts of performance determinants. For each performance variable, we 
derived another two ranking (RA) and standardized (SD) measures in addition to their original amount. 
Since our samples are panel data, we grouped all the firm-years in the same year and then ranked and 
standardize the performance amount, in order to alternatively test for minimizing the performance 
impact from the industry or economic cycle. However, no standardized MVA is derived due to less 
firm-years per year (50%) than ROE and NI, because MVA is not available until a firm is formally 
listed and traded in the stock market. Because the higher ranking with smaller figure, in fact, indicates 
better performance, we hypothesize a negative sign of ranking variables as positive performance effect. 
Patent scale and scope as independent variable. As aforementioned, our study identifies patent 
attributes to represent the firm-specific level of technological innovation. The majority (65%) of 106 
sampled firms had filed their patents with the USPTO. Because the USPTO usually takes around 18 
months to examine the application, and more importantly, the filing time of patent represent the 
completion of innovation, we assigned all the patent data to each applicable firm-year based on the 
filing time, instead of grant time.  
As our data is drawn from annual patent record, one measurement issue is worth noting: the 
episodic nature of patenting activity (Geroski, Reenen, & Walters, 1997). Firms, particular smaller 
and younger ones as our sample, might undertake single innovation projects that last substantially 
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longer than a year. With the measurement base being the one-year period, these firms are likely to be 
overlooked and considered as non-innovating firms even though they do carry a continuous stream of 
innovative activity whether in deepening or widening their technological capacity. Therefore, we 
used all measures of patent portfolio on a 3-year period. That is, we take an accumulative count of 
their patent quantity and patent class configuration in a spell of three years, covering the current focal 
year plus the prior two years. Such data collection based on a three-year period rather than the typical 
1-year period has also been adopted by scholars in assessing innovation persistence (Roper & Hewitt-
Dundasb, 2008).  
Both performance models specify three variables of patent scale and another three of patent 
scope, whose patent portfolio was constructed on the basis of a moving time window of three years as 
stated previously. Simple patent count (COUNT), new-class count (NEW_C), and minor-class count 
(MINOR_C) are specified to measure different aspects of patent scale. Patent counts are more 
frequently used to approximate innovative output (Cohen & Levin, 1989). We measured patent count 
in terms of the number of firm’s patent applications in a spell of three years. This approach equating 
patent scale with patent size is consistent with another similar analysis (Fai & von Tunzelmann, 
2001). However, in response to the criticism that simple patent counts are inherently limited by their 
ability to capture the underlying heterogeneity amongst patents (Cohen & Levin, 1989, Griliches, 
Hall, & Pakes, 1987), our research incorporates the notion of patent scope into two patent-scale 
variables.  
New-class count is defined as the patent number in the new technology class of the current 
patent portfolio as compared with the prior portfolio, to represent the level of new technology 
exploration. In addition, minor-class count is defined as the patent number in the minor technology 
class in the current portfolio to represent the level of non-major or less competitive technology 
exploitation. We followed Narin & Noma’s approach in computing the concentration of company 
patents within a few selected classes (Narin & Noma, 1987). We defined minor-class as IPC, which is 
not one of four major IPCs, including G06F, H01L, G11C, and G11B, representing 45% of 3279 
patents in our samples, as listed in TABLE 4. 
In addition to patent scale, ‘patent-breadth’ has also been recognized as a key determinant of 
patent value (Gilbert & Shapiro, 1990, Klemperer, 1990, Reitzig, 2003). In particular, the number of 
International Patent Classification (IPC) assigned to each patent is commonly used to measure the 
scope of a patent (Chen, Jang, & Wen, 2010, Lerner, 1994, Wen & Chen, 2007). However, because a 
simple class-count measure might be affected by the initial size of patent portfolio, we derive three 
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variables to represent patent scope, including diversity index (DIV), new-class ratio (NEW), and 
minor-class ratio (MINOR).  
In consistent with various previous studies (Garcia-Vega, 2006, Hall, Griliches, & Hausman, 
1986), we constructed the measure of patent diversity based on a Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI) of 
concentration using Delphion patent data. The focal level of aggregation for the classes of technology 
follows the classification of the four-digit IPC code, and each patent can be regarded as pertaining to a 
specific technological class as assigned by the USPTO. Our patent sample is composed of 72 
technological classes; with technological class indexed by j=1,…,72, we obtain the variable that 
measures the extent of patent diversity as follows:  
Thus, the diversity index ranges between zero and one, where a value of zero represents a firm 
concentrating on one technology only, and contrastingly, a value approaching one represents a firm 
with an even distribution of patents across the n technological classes. Following the definitions in 
the sub-session of patent scale, we then derived new-class ratio by computing the patent number in 
the new technology classes, and minor-class ratio by computing the patent number in the minor 
technology classes as a proportion to the total patent count in its focal portfolio. Because the higher 
its minor-class ratio, the more the firm diversifies away from the industry’s technology mainstream; 
therefore, a positive performance effect is posited due to less competitive in minor technological 
fields. 	  
We would like to highlight the value added to devise similar constructs as new-class and 
minor-class innovation into different attributes of patent scale and patent scope, for crystallizing the 
idiosyncratic strategic fitness between innovation strategy and performance target. To illustrate, a 
firm which has applied 15 patents in the given time period, of which 5 pertaining to new 
technological classes has a new-class ratio of 0.33, whereas this ratio for another firm who has in the 
same period, 7 patents, of which 5 pertaining to areas that the firm has not previously involved with, 
is 0.71. While the patent count for the new technology class is the same, ceteris paribus, we argue 
that the former firm is likely to be less diversified than the latter from the perspective of patent scope. 
This new-class ration focuses on innovation activities involving in new technology areas, and 
signifies the notion of diversifying and expanding; it might or might not be in concordance with the 
diversity (DIV) index, which expresses the state of the distribution.	  
Revenues and productivity as mediators. Our performance model specifies two mediators, 
revenues (REV) and productivity (PRO). Revenues represent a firm’s capability to utilize its patent 
portfolio in product market. Productivity, defined as net income per employee, represents the 
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efficiency of its human capital. Based on the assertion that superior patent portfolio enhance a firm’s 
competitive advantage in terms of market power and operational efficiency, we posit that revenues or 
productivity completely mediate patent’s performance effect, when its direct effect (or the result of 
Regression C, patent as IV and performance as DV) is not significantly positive.	  
Test Models 
For testing whether or not the performance effect of patent exists as Hypothesis 1, we split the 
full-sample into 4 pairs of mutually exclusive patenting versus non-patenting sub-samples. Using ROE 
as an example, TABLE 5 illustrates the matrix-dimensions and firm-year counts of each pair of sub-
samples. Then, we conducted 56 t-tests ((8DV+6MV)*4 pairs) on the mean-differences of 8 
performance variables and 6 measures of 2 mediators between each pair.  
For testing more or less the performance effect of patent impacts as Hypothesis 2, we compared 
the results of fixed-effect regressions on the panel data of full-sample and patenting-sample. This 
performance study chose fixed-effect model, instead of random effect, because of the assertion that not 
specified firm-specific attributes impact financial performance overtime. In comparison, the full-sample 
includes both patenting and non-patenting firm-years, so a positive effect indicates the patent premium 
exists of strong technology-innovators when competing with weak technology-innovators with no 
patent at all. Then, we tested each sample by 192 regressions (6IV*8DV*4 lag-years) for illustrating the 
lagging direct effects of patent scale and patent scope, and then by 576 regressions (6IV*8DV* 2MV*2 
steps * 3 lag-years) for illustrating the lagging mediated effects.  
RESULTS & DISCUSSIONS 
The test results generally support our hypothesized positive performance effects of patent 
attributes. In comparison, the t-tests on Hypothesis 1 render stronger empirical support, than the pool 
regressions on Hypothesis 2. Such comparative findings imply that patent filing is a power indicator of 
innovation capabilities of a technology-intensive firm, so no matter what kinds of and how much its 
patent attributes, a patenting firm, whose portfolio has at least one patent, does gain competitive 
advantage over the non-patenting firms and even during non-patenting firm-years.  
In addition, the results that the full-sample demonstrates stronger direct and mediated effects of 
patent than the patenting-sample, imply that the patent premium is stronger when competing with both 
strong and weak technology-innovators than when competing with other patenting firms. Such findings 
help to explain why the empirical support on the hypothesized positive performance effect of patent 
portfolio has been inconclusive. When the sample only includes patenting firms or patenting firm-years, 
the patent premium may be hardly observed and substantiated. In the real business world, patenting 
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firms are competing against both patenting and non-patenting firms; therefore, the empirical results of 
full-sample provide not only stronger support of our hypothesis, but also more applicable managerial 
implications for patent or innovation strategies. 
In a contrast to the general support on the existence of patent’s positive effect on financial 
performance, our findings that some pairs of patent and performance variables fail to demonstrate our 
hypothesized positive performance effect, also support our proposed contingent view of patent or 
innovation strategies.  Given the positive performance of patent, different patent attributes impact 
different performance target by different ways, direct versus mediated effects, concurrent versus 
lagging effects. The following further discuss our research findings and managerial implications. 
Hypothesis 1: Positive Performance Effects of Patenting Firm 
As shown in TABLE 5, we split the full-sample into 4 pairs of patenting and non-patenting sub-
samples, whose summary statistics listed in TABLE 6. Before t-tests, these comparative sample- 
profiles already demonstrates the existence of patent premium of patenting firm-years.  For three 
performance variables and two mediators, the patent premium of the patenting sample over the full 
samples range from 75% of shareholder value (MVA) to 107% of revenues (REV), while with one 
exception that their profits (NI) are only 32% of the full-sample. In terms of control variables about 
firm profiles, the patenting-sample are 1.5 years senior, hires 69% more employees, and spends only 
half of RDI than the full-sample.   
The t-tests results on the mean-differences between four pair of sum-samples are listed in 
TABLE 7. Most of the results support our hypothesized positive performance effects of patenting firms 
at both firm-year and firm-levels.  Such supportive results indicate the patent premium exists even when 
a patenting firm does not have filed any patent within three-year rolling window, when testing its non-
patenting firm-years against non-patenting firms (NP-NY).  The t-test results of original and annually 
standardized performance-values also generally support our proposition that the patent premium of the 
patenting firm-year effect (PS-NY) is the largest and that of the non-patenting firm-year effect of 
patenting firms (NP-NF) is the smallest among 4 pairs of sub-samples. However, the measures of 
performance ranking demonstrate contrasting impacts: the patenting firm effect (PF-NF) is the largest, 
while the firm-year effect of patenting firm (PS-NP) is the smallest. Such contrasting outcomes suggest, 
although patent premium of patenting firms over non-patenting firms is less than patenting firm-years 
over non-patenting firm-years in the amount measures, firms with patent or innovation capability can 
win much higher rankings than their competitors without any. Different relative effects between amount 
and ranking measures also suggest an added value to include ranking measures in performance studies, 
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such that ranking measures are more applicable to medium and small firms due to less scale-biased 
toward larger firms than amount measures. 
Hypothesis 2: Stronger Direct Performance Effects of Patent Scale 
As discussed in Test Models, we tested Hypothesis 2 by 192 regressions for lagging direct effects and 
576 regressions for lagging mediated effects of patent scale and patent scope on each sample of 1026 firm-
years or 327 patenting firm-years. To present all test results is very challenging; therefore, the direct effect of 
patent count (COUNT) with zero lag year is selected for illustrating the regression model and comparing the 
different results between two samples, because that is the strongest performance determinant among six 
patent variables as TABLE 8a and TABLE 8b. 
Owning to missing values of some specified variables, only 921 firm-years of full-sample and 317 
firm-years of patenting sample are tested; while market value approximated (MVA) is tested by even less 
firm-years, because its data is not available until formally listed. The significantly negative signs of the 
square term of patent count (COUNT_SQ) support our proposition of diminishing return to scale of patent’s 
performance effects, which are generally supported by most of significant direct and mediate effects. 
Estimated maximum as the turning point of performance measures are calculated for the supportive results 
as well.  
Table 9 listed the supportive lagging direct effects of applicable pair of patent attributes and 
performance variables (mediators). Among three dimensions of financial performance, both samples rejected 
the positive effect of patent on return on equity (ROE), with only one exception, New-class count (NEW_C) 
in patenting sample. Between two types of patent attributes, patent scale demonstrates stronger direct effects 
than patent scale in both samples; particularly, three variables of patent scope impact performance only in 
the full-sample. Within each type of patent attributes, minor-class ratio (MINOR) is the strongest 
determinant among scope variables; contrastingly, minor-class count (MINOR_C) is the weakest among 
scale variables. Such contrasting results suggest the added value to incorporate both scale and scope terms in 
the performance studies, even when both variables derived from a similar notion. 
Hypothesis 2: Stronger Mediated Effects of Patent on ROE 
Because our performance models posit patent attributes impact performance alternatively 
through direct or mediated effects as illustrated by Complete-Mediating Model in FIGURE 1, we 
found both patent scale and patent count impact ROE through the mediator of productivity with one 
lag-year. TABLE 10 listed the supportive lagging mediated effects of applicable pair of patent attributes 
and performance variables. Productivity serves as a stronger mediator than revenues (REV). In 
comparison, most direct effects extend their impact up to three lag-years; while most mediated effects 
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only sustain for one year.   
As a summary, we found Diversity index (DIV) impacts net income directly; while neither ROE 
nor MVA when testing Full-sample.  Contrastingly, when testing Patenting-sample, patent scope 
doesn’t impact performance with one exception: minor-class ratio (MINOR) impacts performance 
indirectly through productivity. Such exceptional results imply that the blue-ocean strategy works for 
a patenting firm to outperform among technology-innovators by developing its innovation beyond 
industry mainstream. 
CONCLUSION 
Our test results generally support our hypotheses that firms with a patent or superior patent 
portfolio perform better than those without any or with inferior portfolio. In addition, some 
contrasting results between patent scale versus patent scope, between direct and mediated 
performance effects, and between Full-sample and Patenting-sample, suggest the importance of 
strategic fit between patent or innovation strategy and performance targets. Different dimensions of 
strategic orientation, such as minor-class orientation for patenting firms, influence the strategic 
outcomes differently. For future research, further tests using more applicable measures on a much 
larger sample may help to facilitate the generalization of our findings to broader contexts. For 
example, by expanding the sample to include multiple industries and countries, any future studies 
could include other technology-intensive industries, such as foundry and biotechnology, or more 
Fabless firms in the US, Japan and Korea.  
In conclusion, by comparing the t-test results on mean-differences of performance between four 
pairs of patenting versus non-patenting sub-samples, we found empirical support of our hypothesis 
that firms with a patent perform better than those without. Using the fixed effect model, we further 
compared lagging direct and mediated effects among scale and scope attributes of patent portfolio. 
Our results show that patent scale generates stronger direct effects than patent scope in both samples; 
contrastingly patent scope requires mediators to impact performance indirectly in the full-sample, and 
rarely demonstrates any effect in the patenting-sample. In addition, the full-sample of 921 firm-years 
demonstrates a stronger direct or mediated effect of patent than the patenting-sample of 317 firm-
years. Our result comparison implies that a patenting firm with superior patent portfolio may not 
perform better than another patenting firm with less patent scale or scope, given the positive 
performance effect generally over non-patenting firms. Our findings may contribute to specify the 
applicable conditions for a firm to enhance its competitive advantage via patent portfolio by 
proposing a contingent view of innovation strategies.  
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TABLE 1: Firm attributes of sampled versus Semiconductor-leading firms, 20071 
TABLE 3: Correlations of Full Sample 
     TABLE 4: Top 4 IPC1 Major Classes Held by Sampled Firms 
     TABLE 6: Comparative summary statistics of Full Sample and 5 sub-samples for t-tests 
     TABLE 8a: Direct effects of patent scale (COUNT) of Full Sample (lag-year=0) 
     TABLE 8b: Direct effects of patent scale (COUNT) of Patenting Sample (lag-year=0) 
Paper no. P028    Page 17 of 21
2011 AIBSEAR Taipei Conference December 1-3, 2011
AIBSEAR	  2011:	  Innovation, knowledge management and entrepreneurship for international business growth 
 17	  
TABLE 2: Summary statistics and variable definitions of Full Sample 
 
 
Type Variable Description Unit Mean SD Max Min Definition 
ROE Return on Equity % 7.45 42.67 117 -888 
ROE_RA ROE Ranking N 42.42 26.76 100 1 
ROE_SD ROE standardized % 0 0.98 2.59 -6.78 
Net Income / Average Equity 
NI Net Income Million NTD 327 1916 34800 -5675 
NI_RA Net Income Ranking N 42.42 26.76 100 1 
NI_SD Net Income standardized Z 0 0.99 9.48 -3.15 
Revenues - total costs 
MVA Market Value Approximated 
Billion 
NTD 5.33 20.27 298.13 -4.32 
Dependent 
(Performance) 
MVA_RA MVA Ranking N 31.00 22.11 84 1 
Market Value - Amount of Capital 
Invested 
REV Revenues Million NTD 2202 5589 74800 0 Revenues Mediator 
PRO Employee Productivity 
Thousand 
NTD 1040 4640 29288 -99557 
Income before tax / number of 
employee 
AGE No. of Years N 8.24 4.88 23 0 Performance Year - Established Year 
EMP Employee Log Z 4.62 0.96 7.67 1.10 Log of Employee Headcount in Performance Year 
Control 
RDI R&D Intensity % 27.57 166.21 4135 0 R&D Expenses / Revenue in Performance Year 
COUNT Patent Count N 8.65 37.36 604 0 
The total number of patent 
applications submitted by a firm 
over a three-year period. 
NEW_C New-class Count Z 1.15 2.66 20 0 Patent Count * New-class Ratio 
Independent  
(Patent Scale) 
MINOR_C Minor-class Count Z 4.62 16.31 224.10 0 Patent Count * Minor-class Ratio 
DIV Diversity Index % 0.13 0.22 0.74 0  
,calculated based 
on 3-year portfolio. 
Independent 
(Patent 
Scope) 
NEW New-class Ratio % 0.11 0.25 1 0 
The number of patents in the new 
technology class as a proportion of 
the present total patent count of the 
firm over a three-year period. 
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TABLE 5: Matrix of mutually-exclusive 4 pairs of 5 sub-samples, split from Full-sample 
Full-Sample 
(FS: 10261) 
Patenting 
Firm-years 
Non-patenting Firm-
Years (NY: 699) 
Sub-samples Pair of Sub-
samples 
Patenting 
Firms  
Patenting 
Sample 
(PS: 327) 
Non-patenting firm-years 
of Patenting firms  
(NP: 394) 
all firm-years of 
Patenting Firms  
(PF: 721) 
Pair III: PS - NP  
(PF = PS + NP) 
Non-patenting 
Firms 
N/A all firm-years of Non-
patenting Firms 
(NF: 305) 
all firm-years of Non-
patenting Firms (NF: 
305) 
N/A 
Pair of Sub-
samples 
Patenting 
Sample (PS) 
Pair IV: NP - NF 
(NY = NP + NF) 
Pair II: PF - NF 
(FS = PF + NF) 
Pair I: PS - NY 
(FS = PS + NY) 
Note 1: The number shows the firm-year count in each sub-sample, using ROE as an example. 
 
TABLE 7: T-test results on the mean-difference of patenting minus non-patenting sub-samples 
Type Variables Sub-sample Original (+) 
Ranking 
(-) 
Standardized 
(+) 
PS2 - NY2 9.2* 1 -2.3 0.2* 
PF2 - NF2 12.1* -8.5* 0.3* 
PS - NP2 4.89* 1.7 0.1 
ROE /  
Return on Equity 
NP - NF 9.9* - 9.3* 0.3* 
PS – NY3 733.0* -11.6* -0.5* 
PF - NF3 401.7* -13.4* 0.3* 
PS - NP3 696.0* -7.1* 0.4* 
NI / 
Net Income 
NP - NF3 86.1 - 10.2* 0.1* 
PS - NY 7.6* -14.8* 
PF - NF 5.7* - 15.9* 
PS - NP 7.0* - 10.9* 
Performance 
Variables as 
Dependent 
Variables 
(DV) 
MVA /  
Market Value 
Approximated 
NP - NF 1.3 - 9.2* 
N/A 
PS - NY 3446.9* - 18.8* 0. 68* 
PF - NF 2059.7* - 21.7* 0.4* 
PS - NP 3177.4* - 11.6* 0.6* 
REV /  
Revenues 
NP - NF 613.2* - 16.4* 0.1* 
PS - NY 1527.4* - 5.5* 0.4* 
PF - NF 1104.2* - 8.9* 0.3* 
PS - NP 1325.3* - 2.2 0.3* 
Mediator 
Variables 
(MV) PRO / 
Productivity 
NP - NF 474.3 - 7.9* 0.1* 
Notes: 
1. * indicates the difference between two means is not equal to 0 at 95% confidence level. 
2. Definitions of 5 sub-samples, whose statistics listed in TABLE 5: 
• PS = Patenting Sample including only patenting firm-years, also tested for direct and mediated effects. 
• NY = Non-patenting firm-Years of all firms, including patenting and non-patenting firms. 
• PF = all firm-years of Patenting Firms, including patenting and non-patenting firm-years. 
• NF = all firm-years of Non-patenting Firms, including non-patenting firm-years only. 
• NP =Non-patenting firm-years of Patenting firms.  
3. Implication of mean-difference between two sub-samples: 
• PS - NY for patenting firm-year effect, the advantage of Patenting Sample over Non-patenting firm-Years. 
• PF – NF for patenting firm effect, the advantage of Patenting Firms over Non-patenting Firms. 
• PS - NP for firm-year effect of Patenting Firms, the advantage of Patenting firm-years over Non-patenting 
years.  
• NP - NF for Non-patenting firm-year effect of Patenting Firms, the advantage of Non-patenting firm-years 
of Patenting firms over those of Non-patenting firms.
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FIGURE 1: Complete-Mediating Model 
 
             
                                  
 
 
Regression	  C:	  	  
Insignificant	  Direct	  Effect	  
Patent	  Portfolio	  as	  
Independent	  Variables	  (IV)	  
l Patent	  Scale	  1. Patent	  COUNT	  2. NEW-­‐class	  Count	  3. MINOR-­‐class	  Count	  
l Patent	  Scope	  1. DIV	  (Diversity	  Index)	  2. NEW-­‐class	  Ratio	  3. MINOR-­‐class	  Ratio	  	  
	  
Mediator	  Variables	  
(MV)	  
l Revenues	  
l Productivity	  	   Performance	  as	  	  Dependant	  Variables	  (DV)	  
l Return	  on	  Equity	  1. ROE	  2. ROE	  Ranking	  3. ROE	  Standardized	  
l Net	  Income	  1. Net	  Income	  2. Net	  Income	  Ranking	  3. Net	  Income	  Standardized	  
l Market	  Value	  Approximated	  1. MVA	  2. MVA	  Ranking	  
Control	  Variables	  
(CV)	  
l AGE	  
l SIZE	  /	  EMP	  	  	  	  	  (Employee	  Log)	  
l RDI	  
	  
Regression	  B:	  
Positively	  Significant	  
Lag-­‐Year	  =	  1,2,3	  
Lag-­‐Year	  =	  1	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TABLE 9: Comparison of direct and lagging effects between Full and Patenting Samples 
Notes: 
1. 0, 1, 2, 3 indicate the number of years of significant lagging effect in the focal pair of IV and DV.  
2. ^ indicates only the patenting-sample has significant effect; while the full-sample has not. 
3. # indicates only the full-sample has significant effect; while the patenting-sample has not. 
4. Pure numbers without either ^ or # indicate both samples have significant effect. 
5. Blank indicates no significantly positive effect between the focal pair IV and DV. 
6. Red-color indicates the patenting-sample dominates the performance effect than the full-sample (all ^). 
7. Blue-color indicates the full-sample dominates the performance effect than the patenting-sample (all #). 
8. Green-color indicates both samples have the same performance effect (all pure number). 
9. Black-color indicates mixed performance effect between two samples. 
 
TABLE10: Comparison of mediated and lagging effects between Full and Patenting Samples 
Patent Mediator (MV) Revenues (REV) Productivity (PRO) 
(IV) (DV) NI MVA ROE NI MVA 
COUNT NI_SD(1#)  
ROE(1#) 
ROE_RA(1#) 
ROE_SD(1#) 
NI_RA(1#) 
NI_SD(1#)  
NEW_C  MVA_RA (2^,3^) 
ROE(1#) 
ROE_RA(1#) 
ROE_SD(1#) 
  
Patent 
Scale 
MINOR_C NI_SD(1#)  
ROE(1#) 
ROE_RA(1#) 
ROE_SD(1#) 
NI_RA(1#) 
NI_SD(1#)  
NEW   
ROE(1#) 
ROE_RA(1#) 
ROE_SD(1#) 
NI(1) 
NI_RA(1#) 
NI_SD(1) 
MVA(1#) 
MVA_RA 
(1#) 
Patent 
Scope 
MINOR NI_SD (2#,3#) 
MVA 
(2#,3#) 
ROE(1#) 
ROE_RA(1#) 
ROE_SD(1#) 
NI(1^) 
NI_RA(1#) 
NI_SD(1) 
MVA(1) 
Notes:  
1. All notations are specified as TABLE 9.  
2. Patent variable of DIV and Performance variable of ROE when REV as mediator are not listed, because of 
no mediated effects for all pairs of focal IV and DV	  
Patent Performance Return on Equity Net Income Market Value Mediator 
(IV) (DV) ROE ROE  _RA 
ROE 
_SD NI 
NI_R
A NI_SD MVA 
MVA_
RA REV PRO 
COUNT  5  0,1, 2,31 0^
2 0 0#,1, 2,39 
0#,1, 
2,3^ 
0,1,2,3
4 0# 
NEW_C 2^6  0^,2^ 0,1, 2,3# 
0#,1,
2 
0,1, 
2,3# 
0#,1#, 
2#,3# 0#,1#
3 1^,2,3 0 
Patent 
Scale 
MINOR_C    0,1, 2,3 0
8 0 0#,1, 2,3 
0,1, 
2^,3^ 0,1,2,3 0# 
DIV       0#,1#, 2#,3#     
NEW      2#,3#  0#7  0# 
Patent 
Scope 
MINOR    0#,1#, 2#  0#  
0#,1#,
2# 
1#,2#,
3# 0 
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